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ADMIRALTY TORT JURISDICTION

novel suggestion. 92 Under the proposed standard such legislation would become indispensable. In no manner do airplanes, including those carrying cargo
or passengers on transoceanic flights, come within the scope of the purpose of
admiralty jurisdiction. The medium of travel is wholly different and modern
aircraft are not transient or inherently hazardous in the same way as are
maritime vessels. The special problems of aviation accident litigation would
be better controlled by other uniform law, leaving admiralty jurisdiction to
maritime matters.
CONCLUSION

The advantages that accrue from the classification of a tort as maritime
should provide the impetus for the development of a definite jurisdictional
standard. Unfortunately, however, no such guidelines exist today; indeed, there
may be more problems now than ever before. The proposed changes offer a
new direction to the courts. The acceptance of such changes would provide the
federal courts with the consistent and relevant guidelines now lacking.
DAviDR. TYRRELL
92. The Court in Executive Jet noted that if aviation tort cases "should be governed by
uniform substantive and procedural laws... Congress is free to enact legislation applicable
to all such accidents." 409 U.S. at 273-74. See generally Bell, Admiralty Jurisdiction in the
Wake of Executive Jet, 15 ARiz. L. REv. 67 (1973); Moore & Pelaez, Admiralty Jurisdiction:
The Sky's the Limit, 33 J. AiR L. & COMM. 3 (1967); Comment, supra note 4.

FAILURE TO RECORD PROCEEDINGS:
ANOTHER GAP IN THE GLORY OF THE GRAND JURY
Although firmly entrenched as an American and common law institution,1
the grand jury has recently become the subject of broad controversy. 2 Criticism
is based largely on the charge that the grand jury no longer serves the func1. See United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283 (N.D. Cal. 1952). "The grand jury
breathes the spirit of a community into the enforcement of law. Its effect as an institution
for investigation of all, no matter how highly placed, creates the elan of democracy. Here
the people speak through their chosen representatives. This feature has been largely disregarded by the critics. But it is the essence of the rule of the people. The grand jurors may
commit serious errors. But the voters are not deprived of suffrage because of occassional mischances." Id. at 291 (footnotes omitted).
2. The prominent position the grand jury is playing in American politics has drawn
much attention. In the wake of Watergate citizen concern flows with the actions of public
officials. In Florida, for exainple, grand juries were credited with influencing many of the
key races in the 1974 election. See Cox, Grand Juries Had a Lot To Do with Cabinet Races,
Gainesville (Fla.) Sun, Nov. 3, 1974, §B at 3, col. 1.
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tions it was originally instituted to perform: 3 protecting the accused from
oppression by the prosecution4 and determining whether probable cause to
return an indictment existed.5 Critics of the grand jury point out that these
two purposes are inherently contradictory,6 and that in practice the grand
jury, instead of protecting the defendant from oppression, is little more than
7
the "prosecutor's alter ego."
One of the major sources of controvery surrounding grand juries has been
the requirement that grand jury proceedings be secret.8 There are two types
of grand jury secrecy: 9 the secrecy required while the grand jury is in session",
and nondisclosure of records of the proceedings after they have ended." Because some secrecy reasonably may be necessary to prevent interference with
the proceedings, the most cogent criticism of grand jury secrecy has focused on
nondisclosure of the records of the proceedings.
The justification for nondisclosure of records of grand jury proceedings has
historically been based on the need to protect both the efficiency of the grand
jury and the rights of individuals called before it. 12 This justification for non3. Knudsen, PretrialDisclosure of Federal Grand Jury Testimony, 60 F.R.D. 237 (1973)
(originally printed in 48 WASH. L. REV. 423 (1973)). "The arguments most often made
against the grand jury are that the jury is a needless expense; that it may be slow to act in
areas where it meets infrequently; and that it seldom provides protection against unjust
prosecution, since the prosecutor generally has great influence with the jury and may simply
use the jury to insulate himself from responsibility. Proponents of the grand jury argue that
it retains the power to serve as a check on capricious accusation, especially when dealing
with political, racial or religious minorities; that the indicting processes allow the prosecution to subpoena witnesses and get their testimony on record; and that the grand jury can
express the judgment of the community in certain cases of political importance." Id. at 237-38
(footnotes omitted).
4. See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962).
5. "The grand jury is a body known to the common law, to which is committed the
duty of inquiring whether there be probable cause to believe the defendant guilty of the
offense charged." Beavers v. Henkel, 194 U.S. 73, 84 (1903).
6. See, e.g., Sherry, Grand Jury Minutes: The Unreasonable Rule of Secrecy, 48 VA. L.
REv. 668 (1962).
7. See Knudsen, supra note 3, at 242. See also Alexander & Portman, Grand Jury Indictment Versus Prosecution by Information-An Equal Protection-Due Process Issue, 25 HAsTINGS L.J. 997 (1974); Commentary, The Preliminary Hearing Versus the Grand Jury Indictment: "Wasteful Nonsense of Criminal Jurisprudence" Revisited, 26 U. FLA. L. Rv. 825
(1974).
8. See United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283 (N.D. Cal. 1952). The rule of secrecy
was imposed "for two purposes: first, to save grand jurors from embarrassment, pressure,
threats, and reprisals from having their part in an indictment known; second, to aid the
government in prosecution." 7d. at 304 (footnotes omitted).
9. See United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283 (N.D. Cal. 1952); In re Attorney General of United States, 291 N.Y.S. 5, 7 (Kings County Ct. 1936). See also Calkins, The Fading
Myth of Grand Jury Secrecy, 1 JOHN MARSHALL J. 18, 19 (1967).
10. See Comment, Secrecy in Grand Jury Proceedings,38 FORD. L. REV. 307 (1969).
11. In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 234 (1940), the Supreme
Court recognized that "after the grand jury's functions are ended, disclosure is wholly
proper where the ends of justice require it."
12. In United States v. Amazon Indus. Chem. Corp., 55 F.2d 254, 261 (D. Md. 1931), the
traditional reasons for nondisclosure were expressed. These reasons are: "(1) To prevent the
escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to
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disclosure has been limited, however, by numerous state and federal statutes
and rules of court controlling discovery of grand jury testimony.' 3 By delineat-

ing the situations where disclosure may be made, these provisions implicitly
nullify the argument that total nondisclosure is desirable, or even permissible.

4

The irony is that the question whether to disclose transcripts of grand jury
proceedings is often academic because the prosecution is cloaked with authority
to decide whether the proceedings will be recorded at all.15 It is clearly an
empty gesture to grant an accused the right to inspect grand jury testimony
when no transcript of that testimony exists.
This commentary dissuses the reasons for requiring grand jury proceedings
to be recorded, including allowing an accused to exercise statutorily conferred
rights of discovery to test the sufficiency of an indictment, and to afford the
court a more effective means of supervising the actions of both the grand jury
and the prosecutor. Following this discussion is an analysis of the recording
practices of both federal and Florida courts and a summary of the practices
employed by other states.
THE NEED To RECORD GRAND

JURY

PROCEEDINGS

Discovery
Although there has been a recent trend toward liberal discovery#8 the

nature of criminal prosecutions has prevented criminal defendants from enjoying the access to discovery granted to civil litigants.1 Nevertheless, significant progress has been made in liberalizing criminal discovery, 8 beginning
with Jencks v. United States.9 In Jencks, the defendant moved to examine

FBI reports written by undercover agents who were testifying against him at
trial. The Government opposed the motion on the ground that no preliminary
the grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent persons subject to indictment or their
friends from importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may testify before grand jury and later appear at the trial of
those indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who
have information with respect to the commission of crimes; (5) to protect innocent accused
who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation, and
from the expense of standing trial where there was no probability of guilt." See also United
States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 n.6 (1958) (quoting United States v. Rose,
215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954).
13. See text accompanying notes 20-42 infra.
14. See generally ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO DiscovERY AND PROCEDURE BrOPE TRIAL
(Approved Draft 1970).
15. See Knudsen, supra note 3, at 254.
16. Only federal discovery will be discussed at this point. State discovery procedures
vary greatly and are discussed in connection with the state's policies of recording. See text
accompanying notes 109-165 infra.
17. The trend toward liberalism is most pronounced in civil cases. See United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Comment, supra note 10. In civil cases there
is no requirement that either side make a showing of particularized need. Knudsen, supra
note 3, at 244.

18. See Sherry, supra note 6, at 675.
19.

353 U.S. 657 (1957).
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foundation of inconsistency between the reports and the agents' testimony had
been laid.2 0 In holding for the defendant the Court stated that only the defense is adequately equipped to determine the usefulness of documents to be
used in defendant's behalf, and thus for production purposes all it need show
is that the evidence is "relevant, competent and outside any exclusionary
rule."' 21 Jencks, therefore, resulted in greater access to information by shifting
to the Government the burden of showing an overwhelming public interest
calling for nondisclosure.

22

To ensure that courts following Jencks did not allow a defendant unlimited access to confidential government files, Congress enacted the Jencks
Act.2 3 This Act codified the Jencks holding and at the same time limited it to
its facts, thus allowing production of relevant documents without showing a
particularized need only after a government witness has testified on direct examination.24 Since the Act as originally passed contained no reference to grand
jury proceedings, the Supreme Court in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United
States25 held that neither Jencks nor the Jencks Act encompassed grand jury
proceedings.2 6 This interpretation, however, was later repudiated by the
Supreme Court in Dennis v. United States, 27 where the Court held that denial
of a defendant's request to inspect the grand jury testimony of government
witnesses testifying at trial was reversible error.2 8 In Dennis the Court recognized that recent developments 29 making grand jury testimony available to
defendants were "entirely consonant with the growing realization that disclosure, rather than suppression, of relevant materials ordinarily promotes the
proper administration of criminal justice."'3

Dennis created confusion about whether the defense's entitlement to grand
jury testimony is dependent upon a showing of need. Although Dennis indicated, as did Jencks, that a showing of need was not necessary, numerous courts
still require a defendant to demonstrate a particularized need to gain access to
grand jury records. 3 1 Other courts, however, have followed the view that a
20. Id. at 666.
21. Id at 667 (quoting Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414, 420 (1952)).
22. Id. It would seem that the Government is more capable of bearing this burden, since
it has the documents before it.

23. 18 U.S.C. §3500 (1970).
24. See 1957 U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEws 1861, 1861-62.
25. 360 U.S. 395 (1959).
26. Id. at 398.
27. 384 U.S. 855 (1966). The trial court bad denied a motion for inspection on the
basis that no particularized need had been shown.
28.

Id.

29. The Court cited the new liberal discovery rules as the "recent developments." Id. at
870-71. See notes 36-39 infra and accompanying text.
30. 384 U.S. at 870.
31. In Walsh v. United States, 371 F.2d 436 (Ist Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 947
(1966), the court claimed that relief was granted in Dennis on the ground that a showing of
particularized need was shown. The court recognized that the 1966 amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was intended to liberalize discovery, but even so "these
rules give no automatic right to a defendant." Id. at 437. See also United States v. Hensley,
374 F.2d 341 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 923 (1966).
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defendant's access to grand jury records should not be dependent upon a showing of need. 32 This view is supported by the Jencks Act Amendment, passed as
part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,33 which defines "statement"
as: "[A] statement, however taken or recorded, or a transcription thereof, if
any, made by said witness to a grand jury."3 4 This amendment clearly brings
grand jury testimony within the Jencks Act.35
In addition to the Jencks Act, two federal rules of criminal procedure allow discovery of grand jury testimony in some instances. Rule 6 allows disclosure of grand jury testimony prior to or during a judicial proceeding and
becomes operative upon court order or where grounds exist for a defense
motion to dismiss because of occurrences before the grand jury.36 A second
rule, rule 16, applies when the defendant is seeking access to his own testimony.37 In its present form this rule is discretionary and applicable only to
those statements of defendant that the court deems relevant. 38 As might be
expected, varying interpretations by the courts have led to inconsistent application of the rule. A restrictive application places the burden on the defendant
to show cause for the court to grant the motion, while a more liberal approach
requires the Government to bear the burden. 39 A compromise position gives
the defendant an absolute right to grand jury testimony subject to the government's right to a protective order where public policy necessitates nondisclosure as, for example, in cases involving national security.40 The present rule,
however, should be significantly changed by the proposed amendments to the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 41 These amendments, scheduled to become effective in August 1975, provide for mandatory disclosure of any recorded testimony that the defendant gives before a grand jury if the testimony
42
relates to the offense charged.
A defendant entitled to inspect grand jury testimony by reason of either
the Jencks Act or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure may find that this
right is of little use if the prosecution has neglected or refused to record the
32. Leading the cases that have recognized Dennis as doing away with the requirement
of showing a particularized need is United States v. Youngblood, 379 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1967).
"[W]e are holding that a defendant should be entitled to see all the grand jury testimony of
each witness on the subjects about which that witness testified at the defendant's trial.
Nevertheless, despite this rule, the Government, upon a showing that disclosure of particular
material would jeopardize national security or should be denied for other proper reasons,
may seek a protective order from the trial court in order to prevent disclosure to the deId. at 370.
fendant of that particularportion of the grand jury material ....
33. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. 1, §102, 84 Stat. 922.
For legislative history, see 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4007, 4017.
34. 18 US.C. §3500(e)(3) (1970).
35. Id. As a result, the effect of Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 US.
395 (1959), and United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958), is overridden.
36.

F D. R. Cint. P. 6.

37. FEn. R. CRai.

P. 16.

38. See Knudsen, supra note 3, at 253.
39. See, e.g., United States v. Heckman, 479 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1973).
40. See Comment, supra note 10.
41. See Rezneck, The New FederalRules of Criminal Procedure,54 GEo. LJ. 1276 (1966).
42. See Comment on Proposed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. FED. R. Caim. P. 16.
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proceedings. Since an accused can exercise his discovery rights only where the
grand jury proceedings have been recorded, it is inherently contradictory to
allow circumvention of this right through failure or refusal to record the grand
jury proceedings.
Supervision of Indictments and Grand Jury Procedures
Apart from enhancing discovery procedures, recorded grand jury proceedings may also be used to test the sufficiency of an indictment.43 This is a critical
function because a valid indictment is a prerequisite to a court's jurisdiction to
proceed against a defendant .4 Even though an accused may not challenge an
indictment that is valid on its face, 45 he may use the grand jury transcript to
discover whether the indictment was procured through governmental misconduct. 46
Although the United States Supreme Court has held that an indictment
based entirely on hearsay is not constitutionally invalid47 a number of courts
have adopted a "Best Evidence Rule" to be applied to grand jury indictments.

48

This rule discredits an indictment based upon hearsay evidence when

nonhearsay evidence was available. Before this rule will be applied, it must be
determined not only that the grand jury was incorrectly led to believe it was
hearing direct testimony, but also that the grand jury would probably not have
9
indicted the defendant had it heard the eyewitness' testimony.4 Consistent
with this view, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Estepa
dismissed an indictment upon the prosecutor's violation of the Best Evidence
Rule. 50 The court reasoned that it is important to avoid undue reliance upon
hearsay because "an indictment constitutes a finding of probable cause and

43. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 388 (1974); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S.
359 (1956); notes 52-54 infra and accompanying text.
44. Cf. Note, Indictment Sufficiency, 70 COLUM. L. RFv. 876 (1970), which discusses the
sufficiency of the indictment itself.
45. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
46. United States v. Cleary, 265 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1959). After reviewing an indictment
dismissed by a district court because of the self-incrimination privilege, the Second Circuit
reversed on the ground that any impairment of the privilege was not due to government misconduct. See also United States v. Pepe, 367 F. Supp. 1365 (D. Conn. 1973).
47. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 482 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1070 (1973); United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1972).
49. Indictments were dismissed following warnings to prosecutors for using hearsay
testimony when eyewitnesses were available, and when the grand jury was misled as to the
nature of the evidence before it. See United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1972);
United States v. Leibowitz, 420 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Russo, 413 F.2d 432
(2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Carella, 411 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1969).
50. 471 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1972). The court may have dismissed the indictment to
punish the prosecutor rather than protect a right of the accused. In dismissing the indictment the court stated: "We cannot, with proper respect for the discharge of our duties,
content ourselves with yet another admonition; a reversal with instructions to dismiss the
indictment may help to translate the assurances of the United States Attorneys into consistent performance by their assistants." Id. at 1137.
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avoids the need for a preliminary hearing."51 Other courts entirely reject
utilization of the Best Evidence Rule as an instrument to insure the de-

fendant's rights. These courts view the rule merely as a guide in determining
whether the "independence and integrity of the grand jury have been impaired."52 Regardless of which view a court follows, recordation is essential,
for each necessarily presupposes recorded minutes.

Recorded grand jury testimony readily facilitates court supervision of
procedures used by both the prosecutor and the grand jury.53 Because the
prosecution is often obligated to advise the grand jurors on points of law as
well as on procedural matters, a transcript of the entire proceeding enables
the court to ensure that techniques employed by the prosecutor comply with
constitutional principles. The court may also utilize a transcript to weigh
arguments made in support of motions to suppress grand jury testimony or
dismiss indictments. 54 Similarly, an appellate court may use the transcript in
deciding to reverse a lower court's dismissal of an indictment.15

Recorded grand jury testimony can be used to enhance discovery procedures, test the sufficiency of indictment, and insure greater efficiency in court
supervision of prosecutors and grand juries. Perhaps the best argument for the
routine recording of grand jury proceedings is that it is often not certain until
51. 471 F.2d at 1136. See FED. R. CRim. P. 5(c). See also Sciortino v. Zampano. 385 F.2d
132 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1968). "We have not gone so far as to apply

to grand juries the proposal in the American Law Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment
Procedure §§330.4(4) and 340.5 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1972), that hearsay may be received at a
preliminary hearing or by a grand jury only 'if the court determines that it would impose
an unreasonable burden on one of the parties or on a witness to require that the primary
source of the evidence be produced at the hearing, and if the witness furnishes information bearing on the informant's reliability and, as far as possible, the means by which the
information was obtained.' See also ABA Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function
and the Defense Ftinction §3.6 (Approved Draft 1971), although . . . we do not believe
Costello v. United States [citation omitted] would prevent this exercise of our supervisory
powers should we deem it wise." 471 F.2d at 1135.
The District of Columbia Superior Court, finding that a defendant was wrongfully deprived of a preliminary hearing, ordered the Government to provide the defendant with a
transcript of the grand jury testimony. "The grand jury transcripts will give defense counsel
the incidental discovery he would have gained had a preliminary hearing been held and
will avoid the needless consumption of time and energy necessary to conduct a preliminary
hearing. Probable cause has already been established by the return of a valid indictment."
United States v. Strickland, 14 BNA CRIm. L. REP.2324 (D.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 1973).
52. United States v. Newcomb, 488 F.2d 190, 192 (5th Cir. 1974). "Were we to hold that
grand jury minutes must be turned over so that defense counsel could satisfy his mere
suspicion that the indictment was based on insufficient evidence, grand jury proceedings
would effectively be open at the whim of the defense." Id. at 193.
53. A hearing held to determine prosecutorial practices may threaten grand jury
secrecy by requiring additional testimony from witnesses and members of the grand jury.
This threat is minimized when the court makes an in camera inspection of recorded minutes.
54. United States v. Pepe, 367 F. Supp. 1365, 1370 (D. Conn. 1973). "While not every
impairment of constitutional right stems from governmental misconduct, the flagrant abuse
here fully justifies the sanction of dismissal of the indictment."
55. See United States v. Cleary, 265 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1959). 'See also United States v.
Mingoia, 424 F.2d 710, 713-14 nA (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Corallo, 413 F.2d 1306 (2d
Cir. 1969).
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after the proceedings whether the defendant, the government, or the court
will be hampered by the absence of such records. Accordingly, some courts,
cognizant of the numerous advantages of recordation, have begun to require
grand juries to record their proceedings. These courts, however, represent only
a small minority.
FEDERAL PRACTICES OF RECORDING GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS

Frequently, whether grand jury proceedings are recorded depends upon the

person with whom the decision to record lies. When there is no specific federal constitutional or statutory provision requiring grand juries to record their
proceedings, 56 the decision rests with the government. This practice has recently been challenged as more defendants utilize their right to discover grand
jury testimony. 57 Based upon the rationale that, because secrecy is essential,
grand jury testimony must be treated differently from other types of discoverable evidence,5 8 the majority of courts support the contention that
minutes need not be kept. 59
Some courts, reasoning that Dennis does not require it, have refused to

56. See Knudsen, supra note 3, at 253-54. But see ABA COMMITTEE ON RULES, REPORT,
reprinted in 38 F.R.D. 95, 106-06 (1965). "A. Rule 6 (The Grand Jury). After careful study,
described below, the Section of Criminal Law and this Committee recommend that: (1)
Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure be amended to provide that a reporter transcribe the minutes of all proceedings of grand jury which are accusatorial in
nature; that the cost of such transcript be borne by the government of the United States and
the proceedings in transcribed form be filed in a sealed envelope with the appropriate
United States District Court for further necessary action; (2) Similar action be taken either
by changes in the rules of court or by necessary legislation in the several states which
follow the common law practice described herein; (3) After an indictment has been returned against a defendant, or after his arrest, that a copy of the grand jury minutes or
transcript be furnished to him as a matter of right, upon his request, prior to his arraignment or as soon thereafter as is practicable; except in cases where the government reveals
that national security or public interest is involved, in which event grand jury proceedings
shall not be disclosed without an order of the court." Id. at 106.
57. The earliest case in which the court recognized that recordation of grand jury proceedings was the "better practice" and then proceeded to indicate that steps would be taken
to insure the implementation of this policy was United States v. Gramolini, 301 F. Supp. 39,
42 (D.R.I. 1969). See text accompanying notes 68-73 infra.
58. The distinction made is supported by traditional secrecy arguments; that is, it is
necessary in order to (a) prevent escape by the accused, (b) insure candor among grand
jurors, (c) prevent perjury and witness tampering, (d) encourage free disclosures by persons
having knowledge of crimes, and (e) protect innocent accused. See United States v. Proctor =
Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958). See also Knudsen, supra note 3, at 257 n.109.
59. United States v. Jackson, 448 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 924
(1971); United States v. Cramer, '447 F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1024 (1971);
United States v. Aloisio, 440 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 824 (1971); McCaffrey v. United States, 372 F.2d 482 (10th Cir. 1967), cert denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1966);
United States v. Dallago, 312 F. Supp. 249 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). See also 8 J. MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTIcE, The Grand Jury §6.02 n.24 (1973); 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRAcrICE AND PROCEDURE, Indictment and Information §103 (1969).
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command recording of minutes.60 These courts believe that Dennis'" merely
mandates disclosure of grand jury testimony under proper circumstances
where recorded testimony exists and that, because neither party has access to
a transcript, the Dennis Court's condemnation of the government's "exclusive
access to a storehouse of relevant fact" 62 does not apply. Such reasoning, however, ignores the fact that the prosecutor not only is present during grand jury
proceedings but often is in control.63 The effect is that the prosecutor is allowed to make the choice that neither side may benefit from recordation because the benefit to the defendant may outweigh that to the prosecution. 6
Although a few courts are establishing court rules concerning recording,6s
the majority view their role as a supervisory one and therefore refuse to intervene in the absence of flagrant abuse by the prosecutor. 6 The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, recognizing that the preservation of grant jury minutes is a
wise practice, has simply refused to bind the district courts to such a requirement.6 7 Similarly, the Second Circuit has indicated that any change resulting
in mandatory recording should come from the Advisory Committee of Crim8
inal Rules or from the Circuit Council rather than from its own order.6
Mandatory recording, however, is being required by a minority of courts
that recognize recordation as the better practice.6 9 The earliest case to espouse
60.

See, e.g., United States v. Howard, .433 F.2d 1, 2 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.

918 (1970).
61. 384 U.S. at 873.
62. Id. (footnotes omitted).
63. See, e.g., Alexander & Portman, supra note 7; Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury
System, 10 OR. L. REv. 101, 363 (1931).
64. Cf. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82 (1970). "The adversary system of trial is
hardly an end in itself; it is not yet a poker game in which players enjoy an absolute right
always to conceal their cards until played."
65. The local criminal rule requiring recording in the Northern District of California
was recently repealed "'because of noncompliance.' The court felt that it was not in 'a
good position to enforce the rule' since the funds for compensation of court reporters before
the grand jury come 'from the Department of Justice.'" Knudsen,- supra note 3, at 266 n.145.
66. See United States v. Arradondo, 483 F.2d 980 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct.
1428 (1974); United States v. Cooper, 464 F.2d 649 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1107 (1972); United States v. Cramer, 447 F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v. Barson,
434 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1970).
67. In United States v. Aloisio, 440 F.2d 705, 706 (7th Cir. 1971), the court stated it
would rely on "the individual district courts to exercise their local rule-making powers in
this area pending any amendment to Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure."
As an example the court cited the rule promulgated by the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois: "Local Rule 1.04(c) Official Reporter To Attend Sessions of
the Grand Jury. An Official Reporter of this Court shall attend and record all testimony of
witnesses appearing before every Grand Jury. Such record shall be filed with the Clerk of
the Court and transcribed and released to the Court upon order or to the United States
Attorney upon request and payment of the appropriate fees to the Official Reporter." Id. n.2.
68. United States v. Cramer, 477 F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1971). The court stated: "[T]his
would be the worst possible case in which to announce, on a retroactive basis, a per se rule
of exclusion of the testimony of a witness whose grand jury testimony was not recorded." Id.
at 214. In this case the witness had prepared a detailed memorandum recording what
transpired in conferences among federal agents, defendants and their attorneys.
69. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio promulgated a
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this view was United States v. Gramolini,70 where the defendant moved for
dismissal on the grounds that his grand jury testimony had not been recorded.
Although the court had indicated that a failure to keep minutes may be fatal
to the prosecution's case, it denied the motion for dismissal, 71 holding that the
defendant had only demonstrated "the appearance of prejudice" resulting
from the absence of a transcript. 72 The court was reluctant to invalidate all
other indictments pending before it 7 3 and chose instead to rule that from that
date forward indictments would be dismissed upon a failure to record. 74 In
approving mandatory keeping of grand jury minutes and acknowledging that
such a practice promotes greater fairness, the court explicitly rejected the
notion that recordation interferes with the proper functioning of the grand
75
jury.
A series of recent cases arising in the Ninth Circuit further illustrates the
trend toward required recording.7 6 The stated judicial policy of that circuit is
that recordation should be routine and that nonrecordation permissible only
in exceptional circumstances7 After a number of cases in which the district
courts had denied recording to defendants who demanded it,78 the appellate
set of local criminal rules, one of which required the recording of grand jury testimony.
Although the rules were subsequently repealed, Judge Battisti, in his capacity as Chief
Judge, entered an order requiring the recording of all grand jury testimony in the Northern
District of Ohio. The Sixth Circuit in upholding Judge Battisti's order recognized that recording, although not constitutionally required, was the better practice. United States v.
Battisti, 485 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1973).
70. 301 F. Supp. 39, 42 (D.R.I. 1969).
71. ld.
72. In this case minutes would have materially aided the defendant in proving bias,
since the case was presented exclusively by hearsay. Id. at 42-43.
73. The court denied the motion for dismissal on the ground that granting it would
-injure the administration of criminal justice by rendering every presently pending indictment dismissable." Id.
74. Id. at 43.
75. After citing several sources indicating that the keeping of minutes is the better
practice, the judge further supported this view by discussing his own experience, including
18 years as a prosecutor. "Against this background, I unequivocally reject the notion that
recordation of grand jury proceedings interferes with the proper functioning of the grand
jury. In no way does recordation inbibit the grand jury's investigation. True, recordation
restrains certain prosecutorial practices which might, in its absence be used, but that cannot
qualify as a reason not to record. Indeed, a sophisticated prosecutor must acknowledge that
there develops between a grand jury and the prosecutor with whom the grand jury is
closeted a rapport - a dependency relationship- which can easily be turned into an instrument of influence on grand jury deliberations. Recordation is the most effective restraint
upon such potential abuses." 301 F. Supp. at 41, 42.
76. See United States v. Savage, 482 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 1446
(1974); United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 846 (1973);
United States v. Galardi, 476 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 839, 414 U.S.
856 (1973); United States v. Price, 474 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Thoresen,
428 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1970).
77. See United States v. Thoresen, 428 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1970).
78. See United States v. Price, 474 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1973). The court blamed the
recurrence of denied motions on the district courts' hesitancy to exercise discretion. "The
frequency of instances in which denial of preindictment motions has been brought to our
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court held that even where discovery procedure is permissive rather than
mandatory, a court cannot arbitrarily deny permission to record.79 Unless the
government shows that it has a legitimate and compelling interest requiring
nonrecordation,8 0 such a denial by the court may constitute an abuse of discretion."' The effect of this policy, however, has been considerably weakened2 by
the court's refusal to dismiss indictments unless the defendants could present
a clear indication of prejudice.8 3 Nevertheless, in United States v. Brice4 defendants' sentences were vacated, and on remand the court permitted them a
"further opportunity to expand the record by offering additional evidence
bearing on the issue. 85s The court blamed its unwillingness to invoke a rule
requiring dismissal of an indictment on the absence of a "dear indication of
prejudice, although we can give no assurances that such a rule may not be
applied under similar circumstances in the future."8 8
The strongest argument for dismissing an indictment came in the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals -case of United States v. King. 7 The defendants in
that case, after their original indictments were returned, made a timely motion
before a United States magistrate for the transcription of any future grand
jury proceedings that involved them. The magistrate, ignoring the dictates of
the Ninth Circuit,8 denied the motion but warned the United States attorney
that a failure to record, if shown to be prejudicial, might result in dismissal8s
Despite this warning the Government obtained an indictment without recording the proceedings. After being denied discovery of grand jury testimony on
the ground that there was no transcript of the proceedings, the defense unsuccessfully moved for a dismissal of the indictments.9 o Upon appeal, the Ninth
Circuit described the government's actions as "impudent" and "arrogant""' and
noted that dismissing the indictment would be the "only complete remedy,"
but refused to use such a "drastic remedy" in this particular case. 2 To support
attention suggests that the district court's misapprehension of the principle is not uncommon." Id. at 1225 n.3.
79. United States v. Thoresen, 428 F.2d 654, 666 (9th Cir. 1970).
80. United States v Price, 474 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1973). "The Government cannot meet

its burden by resort to the secrecy rubric. Secrecy of grand jury proceedings is not jeopardized
by recordation. The making of a record cannot be equated with disclosure of its contents,
and disclosure is controlled by other means." Id. at 1225.
81. See, e.g., United States v. Savage, 482 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Thoresen, 428 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1970).
82. In United States v. Thoresen, 428 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1970), the court refused to

dismiss the indictment because it was unaware of any precedent for such a course of action.
83. Id. at 666.
84. 474 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1973).
85. Id. at 1226.
86. Id.
87. 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973).
88. See note 76 supra.
89. 478 F.2d at 507.
90. Id.
91. The court's assessment of the government's behavior was based on "a growing
awareness that grand jury secrecy is not an end in itself, and the reasons underlying this
tradition are undergoing judicial scrutiny." Id.
92. Even after stating that the Government will- not heed the warnings given by the
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its hesitancy to dismiss an indictment absent a showing of prejudice or need,
the court delineated the two steps necessary before defendants can utilize their
right to inspect grand jury testimony under Dennis v. United States:93 First,
the proceedings must be recorded, and second, the defendants must show a
particularized need for the transcript. Only after showing such a need will the
defendant be granted the right to inspect the record. It is the denial of the
right to inspect, rather than the failure to record, that results in prejudice. 94
Although the court repeated its warning that the Government is "courting
disaster when it fails to record grand jury proceedings, and the judges should
exercise their discretion to require such recording," 95 it reserved "the matter
of the remedy for a more appropriate case."96
The court's refusal to dismiss indictments absent a clear demonstration of
prejudice results in confusing the remedy with the right. 97 The only way a
defendant can be assured that his testimony will be recorded is if the prosecutor views dismissal as a real threat.98 Application of the two-step test enunciated by the Ninth Circuit would seem to mean that a failure to record, unless
accompanied by a showing of particularized need, would be considered harmless error. It is argued, however, that the right to recordation is a separate
right flowing from the rules and statutes conferring a right to inspect under
proper circumstances and therefore should have a remedy without a showing
of prejudice. 99 The requirement of demonstrating prejudice should attach
only after the proceedings have been recorded and a defendant is seeking
to have the benefit of the right to inspect grand jury testimony. 1 00 As it now
stands, before an indictment will be dismissed a defendant must show a clear
indication of prejudice. 101 In other words, there must be more than mere
speculation to overcome the presumption of regularity of grand jury pro-

court in prior cases until an indictment is actually dismissed, the court refused to dismiss.
The court's refusal was based upon a lack of prejudice. Id. at 507, 508; see United States v.
Thoresen, 428 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1970).
93. 384 U.S. 855 (1966). See notes 28-31 supra. Courts following Dennis have split as to
whether a showing of particularized need is required.
94. The court ignored United States v. Youngblood, 379 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1967), which
held that the defense was entitled to grand jury testimony without a showing of particularized
need; see note 32 supra.
95. United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973).
96. Id. at 508. The court does not describe a "more appropirate case."
97. This also ignores the dictates of Jencks and Dennis, which do away with the requirement of demonstrating need. See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text.
98. See note 50 supra. The courts themselves recognize that only dismissal of an indictment will insure compliance by the Government.
99. The appropriate sanction for lack of a showing of prejudice to the defendant is a
refusal to allow him access to the transcript. Since the right to record can only be safeguarded by sanctions for nonrecording, it seems illogical to say that the right cannot be
exercised without a showing that an accused would be prejudiced by the denial of his right.
100. The right to record must come first because, if there is no recorded testimony, it
would be futile for a defendant to show a need for a nonexistent demand.
101. See United States v. Heckman, 479 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. King,
478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Galardi, 476 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Thoresen, 428 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1970).
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ceedings.102 This reasoning is faulty because if the initial step of recording is
not taken the only remedy remaining, where a defendant does show a particularized need, is dismissal of the indictment. Such a "drastic remedy" would
be unnecessary if the proceedings were recorded to begin with. Even though
it may be necessary to dismiss an indictment in order to show the prosecutor
that the court intends to enforce its policy, the prosecutor will soon record the
grand jury proceedings to protect indictments from dismissal.' 0 3
An additional anomaly results from a further requirement that a.defendant demand recordation prior to the grand jury proceedings. 04 In United
States v. Price the court held that a failure to record after notice to the prosecution that the defendant wants the proceedings to be recorded may jeopardize
a prosecution. 05 Likewise, in United States v. Savage'" and United States v.
Antonicko7 the Ninth Circuit flatly refused to dismiss an indictment where
the demand for recording was made subsequent to the grand jury proceedings.
This gives the right to recordation of grand jury testimony only to those defendants who expect to be indicted and who have the foresight to make the
demand. Thus, the advantage of recorded testimony will never be given to an
accused who is unaware of the proceedings or to one who had not yet employed counsel, since he will not be sufficiently versed in the law to know of
this prerequisite.
Although some federal courts have recently begun to see recordation as the
better practice, implementation of this policy is hampered by the imposition
of unreasonable requirements. For the most part these requirements of showing prior request, need, or prejudice are established as protection against the
inconvenience to the Government that may result from the application of the
"drastic remedy" of dismissing an indictment. Nonetheless, to require an accused first to demand recordation when he may not even be aware of the proceedings and then to show need or prejudice, when he is not certain of the
contents of the transcript, is ridiculous. The potential efficacy of a recordation

policy is greatly diminished by these requirements and by the courts' reluctance
to enforce the policy. Because of their supervisory relationship to grand juries
it is appropriate for courts to take it upon themselves to provide a remedy that
ensures that grand jury proceedings are recorded.
The problems relating to failure to record grand jury testimony, which
102. See, e.g., United States v. Messitte, 324 F. Supp. 334, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); United
States v. Gramolini, 301 F. Supp. 39, 41 (D.R.I. 1969).
103. An analogous rationale was used by the Second Circuit in United States v. Estepa,
471 F.2d at 1137, where an indictment was dismissed to insure compliance with the "Best
Evidence Rule." See notes 48-50 supra and accompanying text.
104.' In United States v. Antonick, 481 F.2d 935, 939 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied; 414
U.S. 1010 (1973), the defendant's first request for recording was filed 9 days after the
indictment was handed down. See also United States v. Price, 474 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1973).
105. 474 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1973).
106. 482 F.2d 1371, 1373 (9th Cir. 1973): "We held in United States v. Price . . . that
upon a proper motion, failure to record grand jury proceedings absent a showing of compelling government interest to be served by nonrecordation is an abuse of discretion by the
district court. In the instant case, however, no request for recordation was made."
107. 481 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1973).
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have occupied the attention of federal courts, have been avoided in the states
that have promulgated statutes establishing requirements for recording. Other
states, however, have recently been faced with the question of the right of an
accused to have grand jury testimony recorded.
STATE PRACTICES OF RECORDING GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS

Florida
Florida has neither a court rule nor a statutory provision expressly requiring recordation of grand jury proceedings. There is, however, one section
of the Florida Grand Jury Statute that indicates a court reporter or stenographer may be present during a session of the grand jury.10s Recently, in State
v. McArthur, the question arose whether this section required, or merely permitted, recording. 10 9 Noting that the question was one of first impression in
Florida, the appellate court in McArthur ruled that grand jury proceedings
need not be recorded as a matter of law.110 The McArthur trial court had dismissed an indictment for first degree murder on the ground that:
[T]he State deliberately and intentionally failed to comply with the
provisions of F.S. 905.17 requiring the presence of a court reporter or
stenographer at sessions of the grand jury when testimony is being taken
and requiring that the stenographic records, notes and transcriptions
shall be filed with the clerk and kept by him to be released on order of
the Court for the purpose of ascertaining whether the Grand Jury
testimony is consistent wth his subsequent testimony before the Court
and for the purpose of furthering justice."'

108.

FLA. STAT. §905.17 (1973). Until enactment of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1939

Florida had no statutory law regarding the presence of a court reporter or stenographer in

the grand jury room during the examination of witnesses. Fla. Laws 1939, ch. 19554. The
passage of the 1939 law made it unlawful to have any court reporter or stenographer present
before the grand jury while it was in session. As originally introduced in the legislature in
1939, §§96, 105, and 106 recognized the propriety of the presence of a court reporter or
stenographer during sessions of the grand jury. During the progress of the bill, however,

§93 was added making it unlawful to have a court reporter or stenographer present before
the grand jury. Fla. Laws 1939, ch. 19554, §§96, 105, 106, at 1324-26. In 1951 Fla. Stat. §905.14
was repealed and FLA. STAT. §905.17 was amended specifically to provide for the presence of
a court reporter. Fla. Laws 1951, ch. 26584, §2, at 237-38. Since that time the statute has
remained essentially the same. See Brief for Appellee at 8, State v. McArthur, 296 So. 2d
97 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1974). The revisors' comment on the 1970 amendment, ch. 70-339, §54,
states: "The proposed section makes changes in style and arrangement only." The 1974
legislature, however, had before it a house bill that would have required a court reporter
to be present at all grand jury sessions and to take minutes verbatim. See 296 So. 2d at 100
n.4.

109. 296 So. 2d 97 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1974).
110. Id. at 98. See also State v. Rucker, 301 So. 2d 501 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1974), where the
court relying on McArthur revised per curiam the trial court's dismissal of an indictment
for lack of recording.
11.
Brief for Appellee at 1-2, State v. McArthur, 296 So. 2d 97 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1974).
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The circuit court believed that failure to provide a court reporter in this
particular proceeding deprived the defendant of substantial rights, which
necessitated a dismissal of the indictment.112 The Fourth District Court of
Appeal, relying on federal cases viewing recordation as permissive rather than
mandatory, disagreed with the circuit court and reversed its decision."23
Utilizing the two-pronged test devised by federal courts, the court required the
defendant to show that he had "a viable need for grand jury testimony" or
that he was a victim of bad faith or arbitrary prosecutorial behavior.114 Since
no showing of need or bad faith had been made the court saw no reason to
dismiss the indictment on the basis that the proceedings were not recorded.1 5
The court also considered demand for recordation a necessary preliminary step
to the dismissal of an indictment."16 In this instance the Florida court found
that "the subject indictment was proper, and should not have been quashed
when no constitutional rights were abrogated, no Florida law was contravened,
and no request for recordation was made by [the defendant]."'" 7
The rationale employed by the court in State v. McArthur"- is inconsistent
with Florida's liberal discovery procedures. By statute,"19 case law, 120 and court
rules' 2' the defendant is permitted access to grand jury testimony if necessary
for impeachment purposes, for determining whether a witness is guilty of
perjury, or for furthering justice.12 2 Additionally, when the accused has testified before the grand jury, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure require the
prosecutor, upon demand by the defendant, to disclose to defense counsel that
portion of recorded grand jury minutes containing the testimony of the accused.

23

112. Id.
113. 296 So. 2d at 98. The defendant relied upon an interpretation of the grand jury
statute as evidenced by the title to the 1951 Act evincing a purpose of providing for the
presence of a court reporter. The title of ch. 26584 reads: "An Act Amending Section 905.17,
Florida Statutes of 1941, to Provide for the Presence of Any Court Reporter or Stenographer
Before the Grand Jury While They Are in Session and to Repeal Section 905.14, Florida
Statutes of 1941." Fla. Laws 1951, ch. 26584, §2, at 237.
114. 296 So. 2d at 99. See text accompanying notes 97-98 supra.
115. 296 So. 2d at 99. See United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494, 507 (9th Cir. 1973).
116. Id. at 100; see text accompanying notes 102-105 supra.
117. 296 So. 2d at 100.
118. Id.
119. FLA. STAT. §905.17 (1973).
120. See, e.g., State v. Gillespie, 227 So. 2d 550 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969); State v. Drayton,
226 So. 2d 469 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969). See also Minton v. State, 113 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1959);
Gordon v. State, 104 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 1958).
121. See note 123 infra.
122. See FLA. STAT. §§905.27(I)(a)-(c) (1973).
123. FIA. R. Caxat. P. 3.220 reads: "3.220 DISCOVERY (a) Prosecutor's Obligation (I)
After filing of an indictment or information, within fifteen days after written demand by the
defendant, the prosecutor shall disclose to defense counsel and permit him to inspect . . . (v)
those portions of recorded grand jury minutes that contain testimony of the accused." The
Committee note appended to this rule indicates that the rule was worded so as to avoid
any inference that it made recording of grand jury testimony mandatory. FLA. R. Clml. P.
3.220 is drawn from rule 2.1 of the ABA Federal Standards.
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In Trafficante v. State12 4 the Florida supreme court held that "an accused
on trial is entitled to the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum to reach testimony of a State's witness given before a grand jury when it is shown that such
testimony is or may be material to the issues in the trial."125 Subsequent cases 126
also recognized the right of the accused, in appropriate circumstances, to have
the grand jury testimony produced either for the defendant's use or for in
camera inspection by the court. 127 Although courts seem willing to allow access to grand jury testimony, the defendant's right of access is worthless if the
testimony before the grand jury has not been recorded. The prosecutor is
therefore given the ability not only to manipulate the grand jury but to circumvent the discovery provisions as well. Discovery in the grand jury context
becomes a right without substance.
As a result of judicial and legislative reluctance to make recording mandatory in Florida, no set policy is followed in the various circuits. Of the state
attorneys responding to a questionnaire,'12 three stated they always record
3
grand jury testimony,129 one never does, 130 and twelve sometimes do.' ' Although in three circuits grand jury testimony is always recorded, the testimony
will not be transcribed except for one of the following reasons: the witness is
accused of perjury, the defendant has been granted access for discovery purposes, the state requests it for impeachement, or the case is unusually complicated. Within these three circuits exists the entire spectrum of requests for
discovery. In the Thirteenth Circuit defense motions for discovery are rarely
made or granted. 13 2 The Eleventh Circuit, however, frequently entertains such
124. 92 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 1957).
125. Id. at 815 (quoting State ex rel. Brown v. Dewell, 123 Fla. 785, 167 So. 687 (1936)).
126. Although there are no Florida cases holding that the failure to have a court reporter present is grounds for dismissal of an indictment, violations of other provisions of

FLi. STAT. §905 have been held to be valid grounds for dismissal. See State ex rel. Losey v.
Willard, 54 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 1951)

(holding that the presence in the grand jury room of

persons other than those specifically authorized by the statute rendered an indictment subject to be quashed on a timely motion); Cotton v. State, 85 Fla. 197, 95 So. 668 (1923) (the
fact that one of the grand jurors returning the indictment was ineligible to serve made

the indictment subject to dismissal); State v. Gartenmayer, 239 So. 2d 116 (3d D.C.A. Fla.
1970); State v. Papy, 239 So. 2d 604 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1970) (the presence of unauthorized
persons in the grand jury room justified dismissal of an information based on a grand
jury indictment).
127. See Minton v. State, 113 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1959); Gordon v. State, 104 So. 2d 524
(Fla. 1958); State v. Gillespie, 227 So. 2d 550 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969); State v. Drayton, 226
So. 2d 469 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969). In Williams v. State, 271 So. 2d 810 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1973),
the court denied defendant's request for production of grand jury minutes because the
record failed to show the defendant had requested production prior to trial.

128. See Appendix infra. Responses to questionnaires are on file in the office of the
University of FloridaLaw Review.

129. The three circuits where grand jury proceedings are always recorded are the l1th,
13th, and 17th.
130. The 20th Circuit is the only circuit answering that it never recorded grand jury
proceedings.
131. The 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 12th, 18th, and 19th Circuits replied
that they do not always record.
132. Interview with Robert H. Bonanno, Assistant State Attorney, 13th Judicial Circuit
of Florida, in Tampa, Florida, Sept. 12, 1974.
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motions, but whether they are granted depends largely upon the judge handling the case.23 3 The response of the Seventeenth Circuit was that a defense
motion for discovery of grand jury testimony is made in every case, although
motions for defendant's testimony are granted only where provided for under
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The state attorney in the Twentieth Circuit stated that inasmuch as recording is not mandatory a court reporter is never present at the grand jury
proceedings. He also stated, however, that this was not the policy of the circuit
but rather his own policy. Even though the proceedings are not recorded,
defense motions for discovery of grand jury testimony are often made. These
motions are routinely denied because the defense is not entitled to the testimony and it is not recorded.
The majority of Florida circuits view recording as a matter of prosecutorial

discretion. The most frequent reasons given for recording were that either the
state attorney's office believes a witness may be lying or the case is unusually
complicated. Another response often given was that the proceedings were recorded when a public official was involved. The Second Circuit also records
all "sex oriented cases." While in most circuits defendants rarely seek discovery of grand jury testimony, the circuits are split as to whether the defense motion, when made, will be granted. Grand jury secrecy was cited a
number of times as a justification of denial of defense motions.134
The obvious conclusion to be drawn from the Florida practice of recording
grand jury proceedings is that gross inconsistencies exist among the circuits.
Even more obvious is the conclusion that some sort of uniformity is needed.
Since a defendant's right to discovery, granted to him by statute, court rule,
and case law can easily be circumvented by the refusal of the prosecutor to
record the proceedings, some assurance is needed that the decision whether to
record is based upon principles of procedural fairness.
Whether to require the recording of grand jury testimony has also arisen
in other states. That various states address the problem differently further
points to the need for some sort of uniformity.
Other States
Generally, the states can be classified into three groups according to their
practice of recording grand jury testimony. The first class consists of those

133. Interview with N. Joseph Durant, Jr., Chief Assistant State Attorney and Legal
Advisor to the Grand Jury, l1th Judicial Circuit of Florida, in Miami, Florida, Sept. 11, 1974.

134. "We feel that the principle of grand jury secrecy is fundamental and that this
principle should not be eroded by either legislation or judicial decisions. We believe that the
policy considerations for secrecy substantially outweigh the complaints of defendants who
have come under scrutiny of the grand jury." Letter from Aaron K. Bowden, Assistant State
Attorney, 4th Judicial Circuit of Florida, to Anne C. Conway, Oct. 14, 1974, on file in the

office
of the
of Florida Law Review.
The
9th University
Circuit blamed
the granting of defense motions for discovery on the fact that
"[m]ost judges do not fully appreciate the necessity for Grand Jury Secrecy. They seem unduly
curious themselves to find out what went on." See Response of 9th Circuit, supra note 128.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1975

17

Florida Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [1975], Art. 7
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LA II REVIEW

[Vol. XXVII

states that prohibit recordation of grand jury testimonyl3s Although only one
state statute expressly forbids the recording of grand jury testimony,36 judicial
interpretations in two other states have, in the interest of protecting grand
jury secrecy, 137 refused to allow minutes to be kept.1 8
The second class, which constitutes the largest grouping, allows but does
not require the keeping of minutes or the recordation of the proceedings. 139
Three states allow either the grand jury, 1 40 the judge,'14 or the prosecuting attorney1 42 the option of requesting recording. As is the case in Florida,14 3 inconsistencies exist in many of these states between their liberal discovery pro44
cedures and their recording practices.1
States in the third group require recording. 45 These states can be further
135.
136.

See IDAHO CODE §19-112 (1947); TENN. CODE §40-1611 (1956); PA. R. CRIt. P. 208.
PA. R. CRIM. P. 208 provides: "The transcription or reproduction by any person of
the testimony of witnesses given before the grand jury is prohibited."
137. The Connecticut court refuses to allow a defendant to "jeopardize [grand jury]
secrecy" by recording, whether in writing or otherwise, what transpires. This is especially
true if recording is desired merely for the purpose of making the grand jury investigation a
more effective tool for discovery. See State v. Vennard, 159 Conn. 385, 270 A.2d 847 (1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1011 (1970). In Parton v. State, 455 S.W.2d 645 (Crim. App. Tenn.
1970), the Tennessee supreme court found no authority for a grand jury to keep minutes
of the testimony of witnesses before them.
138. IDAHO STAT. §19-1112 (1947) enumerates persons allowed to be present at grand
jury proceedings; a court reporter or stenographer is not listed. Case law, however, indicates
that any action taken by the grand jury will not be disturbed because the prosecutor, for
his own purposes, allowed a stenographer to be present in the grand jury room, unless the
accused can show that the presence of the stenographer has in some way been detrimental
to him. See Gasper v. District Court, 74 Idaho 388, 264 P.2d 679 (1953); State v. Barber, 13
Idaho 65, 88 P. 418 (1907).
139. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§43-905-06 (1954); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§22-3010, 3012 (1970);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 §1256 (1964); MD. CTS. & JUD. PRO. CODE ANN. §2-503 (1974);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 221, §86 (Supp. 1967); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §767.16 (1948); Mo.
ANN. STAT. §540.100 (Vernon 1949); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §95-1409 (1947); NEv. REv. STAT.
§29-1407 (1943); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §600:5 (1955); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§2939.09-11
(1953); TEx. CODE CRIMt. PRO. art. 20.09 (Vernon 1966); WYo. STAT. ANN. Grand Jury Section
§§7-92-117.
140. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §54-905 (1964); KAN. STAT. ANN. §22-3004 (1970); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §1256 (1965); MICH. Coeip. LAWS ANN. §767.16 (1948); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§540.100 (Vernon 1949); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §600:5 (1955); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2939.09
(1953); DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 6.
141. See e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §767.16 (1948); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §95-1409
(1947). See also Toth v. Silbert, 184 F. Supp. 163 (N.D. Ohio 1960). "The responsibility for
any relaxing of the rule of secrecy and of suprevision of an 'inquiry should reside in the
court.'" Id. at 167.
142. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §54-45 (1958); LA. CODE CIV. PRO. §434; MASS. ANN. LAws
ch. 221, §86 (1932) (Supp. 1967); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2939.11 (1953).
143. See text accompanying notes 118-123 supra.
144. For example, Ky. R. CRI.
P. 5.16(2) requires that "any person indicted by the
grand jury shall have a right to procure a transcript of any stenographic notes or recordings
relating to his indictment or any part thereof .... " The courts, however, have held that this
rule does not require that testimony of witnesses be taken and transcribed. See Amburgey
v. Commonwealth, 415 S.W.2d 103 (Ky. 1967); White v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 770
(Ky. 1965). See also People v. Embry, 12 Ill. App. 3d 332, 297 N.E.2d 604 (1973).
145. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §21-411A (Supp. 1974-1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
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divided according to their discovery procedures. Most of the states in this
category allow the defendant only limited access to the testimony even though
they require preservation of the minutes.1 4( The purposes for which disclosure
is allowed include impeaching witnesses, 47 proving perjury charges, 148 complying with the discovery rules of procedure, 49 and furthering justice.250 Other
states, however, place the burden upon the prosecutor to show a compelling
need for nondisclosure.' 5 '
Certain other states within this third group have unique policies. In Iowa
when an indictment is held to be insufficient, an order is made to resubmit the
case to the grand jury. Under those circumstances it is unnecessary to summon
the witnesses again before the grand jury, since state law permits the grand
jury minutes to be used on resubmission. The defective indictment and the
minutes of the testimony are returned to the grand jury, which can then return
a proper indictment without eliciting additional testimony. 5 2 Minnesota also
has an unusual policy in that recording is always required, but a copy of the
testimony is only furnished to the defendant in case of a presentment and not
an indictment. 5 3
The most liberal state, as far as access to recorded grand jury testimony is
concerned, is California. California law not only requires that the grand jury
appoint a competent stenographer and furnish the defendant with a transcript,'54 but it also requires a continuance until the defendant receives a
copy.5 5 One California case required that all grand jury testimony be given
§§112-16 (Smith-Hurd 1970); IND. ANN. STAT. §9-810 (Burns 1956); MINN. STAT. ANN. §628.57
(1971); NEv. REv. STAT. §172.215 (1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-5-8 (1953); N.Y. CraIM. PRO.
LAW §190.20(3) (McKinney 1971); N.D. CENT. CODE §29-10.1-16 (1974); S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. §230290 3 §23-29-13 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN. §77-18-7 (1953); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§10.27.070(4) (Supp. 1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. §255.12 (1971); ARiz. R. CRM. P. 12.8; COLO. R.
CRIM. P. 16; VT. R. Cpam.P. 6(d).
146. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §328 (1936); Omi REV. STAT. §132.220 (1973); S.D.
COMPILED LAWs ANN.§23-30-14 (Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. §77-19-10 (1953); WASH. REV.
CODE §10.27.090(5) (Supp. 1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. §255.21 (1971); VT. R. CRIM. P. 6(d),
16(a)(2)(B).
147. See State v. Harries, 118 Utah 260, 221 P.2d 605 (1950).
148. OR. REv. STAT. §132.220 (1973); S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. §23-30-14 (Supp. 1974).
149. See VT. R. CIM. P. 16(a)(2).
150. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §10.27.090(5) (Supp. 1973).
151. See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §12-411A (Supp. 1974); N.D. CENT. CODE §29-10.16 (1974);
COLO. R. CRiM. P. 16(c)(2).
152. IOWA CODE ANN.§772.5 (1946).
153. MINN. STAT. ANN. §628.04 (1971). See State v. Falcone, 292 Minn. 365, 195 N.W.2d
Robertson v. Steele, 117 Minn. 384 (1912).
572 (1972); State ex rel.
154. CAL. PENAL CODE §938 (West 1970).
155. CAL. PENAL CODE §938.1 (West 1970). That courts are reluctant to dismiss indictments is further evidenced by a case interpreting the California statute that arose in a
federal district court in the Southern District of New York. The defendant was a fugitive
from California and was arrested in New York. After the Governor of California issued a
warrant for her extradition the defendant sought a writ of habeas corpus urging that the
affidavit of the California district attorney failed to show probable cause. The requisition for
the warrant was supported by an indictment returned by the grand jury of Marion County,
California, and the defense argued that because the statute had not been complied with the
indictment was invalid. Without the indictment there would be no probable cause for the
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to the defendant, not just that which was used as a basis for the return of the
indictment." 5 The possible impact of the California law has been diminished,
however, by judicial interpretations. An appellate court in People v. Carella,5 7
for example, stated that the "object of these provisions is to enable the defendant to know the testimony upon which the charge against him is founded,
and to make his defense. .

.

. Noncompliance therewith does not affect the

validity of the indictment or the jurisdiction of the court to proceed thereunder."158 Under the circumstances of the case, the court found the failure to
comply with the statute was harmless.'5 9
Nevada is the only state that imposes the extreme sanction of dismissal of
indictment for failure to record.160 In Bonnenfant v. State'6 ' the Nevada supreme court stated that the primary purpose of the statute requiring recording
is to enable an accused to test probable cause 1 62 and that the statute benefited
the accused by according him new protection against ill-founded charges. 6 In
this case a prior indictment was dismissed because no transcript was made of
6
the proceedings.' '
As was seen most clearly in Florida, it makes little sense to liberalize disaffidavit. The California statute directs that the transcript cannot be exhibited to anyone
other than the district attorney until the defendant is in custody. The defendant was denied
a transcript because she was not "in custody" in California. She was therefore unable to test
the sufficiency of the warrant. Davis v. Behagen, 321 F. Supp. 1216 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), all'd,
436 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1971).
156. People v. Pipes, 179 Cal. App. 2d 547, 3 Cal. Rptr. 814 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960). "It is
not for the grand jury, its foreman, or any member thereof, or the court to determine what
testimony taken in the course of an investigation of a criminal cause was considered in
returning an indictment respecting such cause, and direct that such testimony alone should
be reported and transcribed." Id. at 554, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 818. The court belived, however,
that unless the error was prejudicial a reversal would not be justified. Id. at 556-57, 3 Cal.
Rptr. at 819.
157. 191 Cal. App. 2d 115, 12 Cal. Rptr. 446 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
158. Id. at 125, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 451.
159. "Unless noncompliance with the statute prejudiced the defendants they are not
entitled to urge a reversal of the judgment on account thereof .... There is no showing that
the failure to obtain the names of all the witnesses appearing before the grand jury or a
transcript of their testimony until after the trial had commenced prejudiced the defense in
this case in any way." Id. at 126, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 452. The court based its reasoning on its
belief that "[t]he law is the protector but not the puppet of the accused." Id.
160. See NEv. REV. STAT. §172.215 (1973). The stenographer is required to file with
the county clerk an original transcript, which is then delivered to the district attorney, and
enough copies for the judge and each defendant. NEv. REV. STAT. §172.225 (1973).
161. 86 Nev. 393, 469 P.2d 401 (1970).
162. Id. at 395, 469 P.2d at 402. Prior to enactment of the statute directing that a copy
of the transcript be given to the accused, probable cause could only be tested by compelling
the witness who had given evidence before the grand jury to testify in support of the
challenge. Id.
163. Id. The protection is based upon the fact that only in rare circumstances could the
accused get a witness to testify in support of his challenge of probable cause. See Ex parte
Colton, 72 Nev. 83, 295, 383 (1956); Ex parte Stearns, 68 Nev. 155, 227 P.2d 971 (1951);
Eureka County Bank Habeas Corpus Cases, 35 Nev. 80, 126 P. 655 (1912).
164. 36 Nev. at 395, 469 P.2d at 402. The defendant argued against resubmission of the
case to the same grand jury on the grounds of irreparable prejudice. The court, however,
said that because the evidence may be reviewed by the use of the transcript to determine
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covery procedures yet at the same time to regard recording, the means to
implement the policy, as permissive rather than mandatory. While the divergent views of the various states demonstrate that it is not essential to link the
recordation of grand jury proceedings to the traditional concepts of grand
jury secrecy, they also demonstrate that there is some need for uniformity in
policy to insure potential defendants of their rights to due process of law.
Perhaps the federal solution, which considers a denial of a request for recordation to be an abuse of judicial discretion, would be sufficient if supported by
effective means of enforcement. In any event, it would seem that in recognition that recordation is the "better practice," the courts on all levels should
take it upon themselves to insure the institution of such sound policy.
CONCLUSION

Most courts addressing the question have held that an accused has no constitutional right to recorded grand jury testimony. 65 This view ignores the
fact that regularity and procedural fairness are indispensable elements of due
process. 166 As Justice Douglas commented in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath: "[I]t is not without significance that most of the provisions
of the Bill of Rights are procedural. It is procedure that spells much of the
difference between rule by law and rule by whim or caprice. Steadfast adherence to strict procedural safeguards is our main assurance that there will be
equal justice under law."'167 Grand juries, by their very nature, make strict
procedural safeguards essential. The accused is not afforded the right to have
counsel present at the proceedings to advise him or to oversee the methods
employed by the prosecution in presenting its case. The accused himself may
be subjected to questioning by an accusatorial body that in many cases is
being manipulated by his adversary. 68 Because no one is present to protect
his interests, it is the duty of the court to do so. This can only be accomplished
effectively through the use of a recorded transcript. Otherwise, as long as the
grand jury is potentially, if not actually, subject to manipulation by the prosecutor, the due process requirement of fundamental fairness is avoided. Additionally, the failure of the courts to impose a mandatory requirement of recording grand jury testimony gives a prosecutor an opportunity to circumvent
the rights of discovery given to a defendant by statute, court rule, and case
law. The illogic of allowing an adversary this advantage is apparent.
ANNE CALLAGHAN CONWAY

legal sufficiency, a court need not worry whether the indictment was returned by a prejudiced
grand jury. Id. at 396, 469 P.2d at 403.
165. See United States v. Battisti, 486 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. King,
478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Thoresen, 428 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1970).
166. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). "Due Process clause requires that
the state adopt a procedure which will insure that no person is required to stand trial at
the whim or caprice of the prosecuting attorney." Alexander & Portman, supra note 7, at
1001-02.
167. 341 U.S. 123, 179 (1951) (Douglas, J., concurring).
168. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
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APPENDIX
QUFSTIONNAIRE

1. It is the policy of this circuit to:
A. Never have a court reporter present at grand jury proceedings.
The reason for this policy is:
a. It is a policy matter, since recording is not mandatory
b. It is too expensive to record
c. Other:
B. Always record the grand jury testimony.
Since a court reporter is always present, when are the proceedings transcribed?
a. Only when the witness is accused of perjury
b. When the defendant has been granted access for discovery purposes
c. Other:
C. Sometimes have a court reporter present.
The proceedings are recorded for one or more of the following reasons:
a. The defendant has requested that the proceedings be recorded
b. The state attorney's office believes a witness may be lying
c. The case is unusually complicated
d. The state will be benefited at trial if it has a transcript of the grand jury
proceedings
e. Other
2. How often do cases arise where the defense makes a motion for discovery of grand jury
testimony?
3. Are these motions usually granted? If not, on what grounds are they denied?
4. Comments:
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